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Abstract
This paper adopts a hermeneutical approach to Japanese thought, in the light of Hei-
deggerian thought, in order to reassess the way we understand space. In a first stage, a 
few ideas concerning Japanese language and aesthetics will be briefly addressed for a 
better understanding of how space is embraced in Japanese thought and culture (ex-
perience precedes description). We will then turn to the two main concepts: fūdo (mi-
lieu) and basho (place), coined by two 20th century philosophers: Watsuji Tetsurō and 
Nishida Kitarō. The logic behind fūdo is that a true awareness of space is built not from 
thinking about it – since we are already objectifying it and, therefore, understanding 
ourselves detached from it –, but from being in it; experiencing it. The concept of basho 
represents a more logical argument and allows us to focus on the relation between the 
particular and the universal; or, as we will see, between being and space. What we can 
conclude from the articulation and interpretation of these two concepts is that space 
is certainly more than just a pure geometrical concept or a receptacle where human 
beings exist – it can also be thought of as a part of being.
Keywords
Space; Being; Japanese thought; Ontology
Ricardo Santos Alexandre146
Human beings are creatures of distance! And only by way of the real pri-
mordial distance that the human in his transcendence establishes toward all 
beings does the true nearness of things begin to grow in him. (Heidegger 
1984, 221)
What exactly is space? And how can we define it? Probably, these questions 
will only be partially answered at the end of this paper; and, apart from the 
general notion of ‘space as a part of being’ that pervades this paper, answer 
them is not my purpose. Mainly because in trying to do so, tasks analogous 
to those required for interrogations such as ‘What it means to be a human 
being?’ or ‘What is good and bad?’ will certainly come up. The problem 
with all these notions – space included – is that defining them or theori-
zing about them might lead us towards a different direction than the one 
we wanted to go in the first place: the abstract. This does not mean that we 
should stop trying to think about space, but that the best way to know and 
understand it is through lived experience, through constant subjective and 
inter-subjective interpretation of ourselves in our relation to it. What I say 
or think about the word ‘space’ is near meaningless if not anchored to a 
concrete experience of it.
The role of experience in space is first credited to Kant for the sig-
nificant leap he gave by focusing on bodily orientation and experience, 
thus breaking with the polarity between absolute and relative space. His 
insights were then developed by Husserl, who expanded the focus of spa-
tial experience from the body to, what he called, the ‘near-sphere’ (nah-
-sphäre): “the proximal place or places in which I am or to which I can 
go”1 – space had turned into a kinesthetic dimension. Later, this focus on 
kinesthesia was reviewed by Merleau-Ponty who elevated the experiential 
dimension of space to a level embedded not in one’s body, but in the enti-
re perceptual field. In later works he reacts against the excessive focus (in 
Kant and Husserl) on “bodily bilaterality” (two eyes, two ears, two hands); 
for it led to a “fragmentation of being” and “a possibility for separation”2. 
Probably due to this “danger” of objectifying the body in order to invoke 
spatial experience, Heidegger did not apply it as a means to his discourse 
on space3. One interesting notion he uses when treating space is “making 
room” (einrãumen): an ontological aspect of Dasein that consists in the ways 
he creates a space that allows him certain actions. With this, he turns ho-
mogeneous space into a secondary dimension of spatiality. In Casey’s words4, 
“There can be no such homogeneous medium as space unless room as 
1.  Casey 1997, 219–220
2.  Merleau-Ponty as quoted by Casey 1997, 236–37
3.  Casey 1997, 243
4.  Casey 1997, 252
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been made within a given region of the ready-to-hand”. If we acknowledge 
that human beings are spatial – always already-in-the-world, and constantly 
“making room” – then space can be thought of as the medium through 
which human perception is constructed.
Nowadays, the role of experience is becoming crucial for any account 
of space. Even though, we still tend to build complex and intricate theo-
ries of space, even when focusing on body experience, which tend to over-
-objectify it. In the case of Japanese thought, until the encounter with the 
West in 1868, there was no problematization of space. Philosophy and Aes-
thetics were not thought of as separated disciplines, but as one single way 
to improve the self through the refinement of the sensuous experience of 
things – and not their exhaustive description. The word used today for spa-
ce, kūkan 空間, was only coined after the referred encounter as a translation 
of the western abstract and measurable notion of space. Prior to that, what 
we find in Japanese traditional thought is a conception of space primarily 
based on the word ma 間 ‘interval’ – a fundamental notion of the Japanese 
sense of space: space grasped not through description, but through direct 
perception of the sensible phenomena5.
The encounter of Japanese and Western philosophy brought up their 
differences while, at the same time, gave both sides new tools of thinking. 
The two philosophers discussed below were both living during an era of 
intense intercultural exchange with the Western traditions of thought and 
science when they wrote these works. Watsuji Tetsurō’s fūdo is embraced 
here as an ethical concept and shows us a reluctance towards defining or 
theorizing space or nature; Nishida Kitarō’s logic of basho, on the other 
hand, is helpful mainly from a pure logical perspective and from his ac-
count on the ‘particular-universal’ relation.
In the following arguments I will try to avoid theorizing too much 
about the nature of space itself while proposing a new way to think about it, 
drawing a few stimulating insights from a few sources of Japanese thought. 
We will first begin our analysis with a brief look into both Japanese lan-
guage (especially the word ma 間 ‘interval’) and aesthetic ideals, and their 
value for an account of space based on experience rather than description. 
Then, entering the realm of philosophy, Watsuji Tetsurō’s fūdo and Nishida 
Kitarō’s basho will be presented, each followed by an interpretation of their 
logics. Both these concepts are not problematizations of space, but hold 
some interesting clues that will help us reevaluate how we think about it in 
relation to being. But first let me define briefly what I understand as being 
is this paper.
5.  Nitschke 1966
A brief clarification of being
Before beginning our analysis, there are a few ideas that should be clarified 
regarding the notion of being used here. Heidegger’s being-in-the-world, or 
Dasein, presupposes a being already thrown up in the world before he starts 
to make meaning out of it. Furthermore, as he puts it, “Dasein is already 
ahead of itself”6. This means that one characteristic of Dasein is to be con-
cerned with the possibility of its own being. In other words, being-ahead-
-of-itself is a condition of being that directs him towards his own (future) 
possibilities of being. This structure of being is comprised in the notion of 
‘care’ (sorge); not emotionally (like worry, etc.), but ontologically, as being 
towards7. 
The way he addresses this dimension of being is an example of his 
need to reformulate language to convey his message. Nonetheless, the fun-
damental idea behind it is similar to Husserl’s ‘intentionality’: the idea that 
‘to be conscious is to be conscious of something’; there is always something 
towards which we are in the world. The difference between Heidegger and 
Husserl is that the former, although never using such a term, builds his own 
notion of intentionality by refusing to focus on consciousness itself, but on 
a level prior to our being-conscious-of-consciousness8. For Heidegger “our 
fundamental sense of things is not as objects of perception and knowledge, 
but rather as instrumental objects that fit naturally in our ordinary practi-
cal activity” 9– it is fundamentally a praxis-oriented account of being.
Nonetheless, what is important to retain here is being not as some kind 
of attribute embedded in the physical subject, but as a continuous process 
of intentional “circumspection” (umsicht) that constitutes that subject’s 
own existence. Charles Guignon10 summarizes it: “As ex-sisting (from ex-
-sistere, standing outside itself) Dasein is always already “out there,” engaged 
in undertakings, directed toward its realization” – and this is the essence of 
being I wish to emphasize in this paper.
Japanese perception: from language to aesthetics
There are two fundamental aspects that I want to focus regarding space 
in Japanese perception. The first one is the Chinese character ma 間, ‘in-
terval’. This is a very significant word in Japanese architecture, arts and 
ethics, and no account of space or place in Japanese thought can ignore 
6.  Heidegger 1962, 236
7.  Heidegger 1962, 237
8.  see Crowell 2005
9.  Hall 1993, 125
10.  C. Guignon 2005, 397
Ricardo Santos Alexandre148
its relevance. It has been rendered as “sense of place”, “not as something 
that is created by compositional elements, [but] the thing that takes place 
in the imagination of the human who experiences those elements”11. Its 
ideogram depicts the sun 日 showing through an open gate 門. Thus, aside 
from ‘interval’, the space that this character implies is not an empty space, 
but one that establishes the very possibility of relating to something – in 
this case: the sun. It is a relational space; a space that is not just a measurable 
area, but the very possibility of relation. In this sense, and as Nitschke 12 writes, 
it “fully expresses the two simultaneous components of a sense of place: the 
objective, given aspect and the subjective, felt aspect”. We can also identify 
this concept in (a) the sumi-e monochromatic painting, where, rather than 
an object’s detailed depiction, a great amount of space is left blank to in-
vite suggestion and imagination 13; in (b) architecture, as a principle used 
in the creation of a room or a space for a very specific action 14; or (c) as a 
concept influenced by Buddhism and in work, for example, in the famous 
temple Ryoan-ji 15, where space is experienced by the minimum detail and 
complexity, inviting the viewer’s imagination.
The most relevant aspect regarding ma is that it forms part of the Japa-
nese word for ‘human’: ningen 人間. The first character means ‘man’; the 
word literally means ‘among men’ or ‘interval between men’. Thus, unlike 
the West where ‘human’ usually means an individual contained in himself 
(like the Greek ‘Anthropos’, the Latin ‘homo’ or the English ‘man’), in 
Japanese language, we can consider that being human intuitively holds 
a sense of space. Watsuji Tetsurō works his theory of fūdo 16, that we will 
address later, and of Ethics 17 based on the analysis of the word ningen; in the 
latter he develops the notion aidagara 間柄 or ‘betweeness’ (note the first 
character) as an ethical foundation for being human.
The second aspect is the impact that this particular ‘spatial thinking’ 
has on the aesthetic ideals that permeate Japanese arts. Without going into 
detail I will introduce a few ideas that we can find in Japanese aesthetics 
that will prepare the ground for the philosophical approach we will take 
below. Donald Keene (1995) defined ‘suggestion’ as one of the four cha-
racteristics of Japanese aesthetics. He opposes it to the “Western ideal of 
the climactic moment” that “grants little importance to the beginnings and 
11.  Nitschke 1966, 117
12.  Nitschke 1993, 49
13.  Parkes 1995, 90
14.  The tea ceremony room, for example. Nitschke 1966
15.  Iimiura 2002
16.  Watsuji 1979; Watsuji 1988
17.  Watsuji 1996
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endings”18. Indeed, most painting (as we saw already in the sumi-e) and 
poetry, as well as most aesthetic ideals, are fundamentally suggestive. There 
is a manifest intention to present the least possible detail on what is being 
depicted, trying not to limit the reader/spectator’s possibility of unders-
tanding while allowing imagination to fill in the ‘empty spaces’. We can see 
this in the following poem:
An old pond,
A frog leaps in.
The sound of water.
Here the details are minimized; the poet just presents the scene. He 
does not explain it or puts his own emotions into it; for the scene itself 
cannot be described. The reader has to experience it himself and he does 
it through his own imagination, filling the poem’s ‘empty spaces’. Yasuda 
19 states it perfectly: 
Here we want no adjective to blur our impression; the picture speaks for 
itself. We seek no metaphor or simile to make the picture clear, but simply 
let the objects do their part. (…) then our understanding will supply the 
necessary adjectives.
There are many aesthetic ideals that could be discussed regarding 
‘suggestion’, but the one I feel is the most relevant for our analysis is yūgen 
幽玄 (mysterious, subtle, hidden beauty) 20, for it largely summarizes all 
the aesthetic ideals that permeate poetry, drama, painting, gardens and 
tea ceremony during the 12th to 17th centuries 21. Yūgen describes the hidden 
or profound feeling that “may be comprehended by the mind, but cannot 
be expressed in words”22. There are everywhere and at several occasions 
moments when the phenomena being experienced transcend any descrip-
tion. And even when someone describes such moments exquisitely – like, 
for instance, Marcel Proust did – we still tend to turn them inside and fit 
them to a similar moment in our own lived experience. There are certainly 
no words to define such moments – still, the Japanese managed to coin an 
emotionally charged word that would refer to what is indescribable: yūgen. 
Eventually other aesthetic ideals could be brought here and we would 
find in them more or less the same underlying principle: suggestion. In-
18.  Keene 1995, 31
19.  Yasuda 1995, 129
20.  The yūgen ideal was brought to the highest degree of refinement through the Nō theatre. The 
actor’s slow, stylized movements are used as a means to suggest and not represent something. Besides, 
there is also the idea that the “no-action” moments were the most enjoyable, since they incite our 
own involvement in the play. see de Bary 1958, Chapter 14; Ueda 1995
21.  de Bary 1958, 278
22.  a passage of a XV century book quoted by de Bary 1958, 279
Ricardo Santos Alexandre150
deed, there is a preoccupation with avoiding detailed descriptions or de-
finitions, inciting lived experience – experience precede description. Which 
amounts to saying, feeling precede thinking, aesthetics precede philosophy. 
And traditionally, until the 18th century Japan, aesthetics did not develop 
as a separate field from philosophy. On the contrary, the aesthetic expe-
rience – whether poetry, calligraphy, painting or the tea ceremony – was, 
to a great extent, the medium through which philosophical thinking was 
produced23. Now, if we turn to the origin of the word ‘aesthetics’ – the 
Greek aisthētikos, ‘perceptible things’, from the verb aisthesthai ‘perceive’ –, 
an aesthetic experience is but a relation with what surrounds us, a way of 
perceiving. In this sense, Japanese aesthetics can show us a particular way 
of relating to space through its conceptual language and arts.
Fūdo as space ethics
The term fūdo 風土 (literally ‘wind and earth’) was coined by Watsuji Tetsurō 
in 1935 in a book considered as a theory of geographical determinism: 
Fūdo: an anthropological inquire. In the first section he starts with a philoso-
phical consideration of the environment and its influence on humans. In 
the second section, he engages in a description of three types of climate 
– monsoon, desert and meadow – and the different characteristics of those 
who live under these different climates. 
However, just as Augustin Berque has been showing for more than 
thirty years24, there is more behind Watsuji’s book than simple determi-
nism. The first thing to take into account when trying to transcend the 
deterministic reading is the very translation of the word ‘fūdo’ as ‘climate’. 
In 1961 the book was translated into English by Geoffrey Bownas under the 
title Climate: a philosophical study; and then changed, in the 1988 edition, 
to Climate and Culture: a philosophical study. Just as Berque shows us below, 
the whole structure of this translation leads to strange renderings of the 
derivatives Watsuji coins from the substantive fūdo:
This lack of understanding sometimes leads Bownas to surrealistic 
roundabouts in order to avoid rendering the idea of fūdosei [‘function of 
climate’ or ‘human climate’, according to Bownas; ‘mediance’ according to Berque] 
in some passages which are meant to illustrate it; roundabouts which are 
indeed inescapable, since the translation, straightaway, locks out the pur-
port of the book.25
Many scholars still choose to use Bownas’ translation when treating 
23.  Parkes 1995, 82
24.  The book where Berque exposes his interpretation of Watsuji’s ideas was first published in 
French (Berque 1986), then translated to Japanese (Berque 1988) and to English (Berque 1997).
25.  Berque 2004, 390
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Watsuji’s theory26. For that reason, justifying the translation’s choice turns 
out to be essential to the present argument. We can start by taking a look at 
the terms used by Berque when translating Watsuji’s theory. The main one, 
fūdo, is translated as milieu. Here, the author wanted the translation to keep 
the underlying meaning of the original word: fūdo 風土 has the character of 
wind and earth, but the wind character 風 also means ‘ways’ or ‘customs’. 
Following this, Berque recovered the word milieu, coined by the French 
geographer Vida de la Blache (1845-1918), that stands for the relation be-
tween humans and their particular environment; a relation both subjective and 
objective, natural and cultural, collective and individual. With this, Berque 
moves closer to Watsuji’s intention of avoiding the word ‘nature’: when we 
think about the natural environment, we tend to think of it as the concrete 
base of human life, and so we separate both human life and nature; “we then 
find ourselves examining the relation between two objects”27. From the 
term fūdo, Watsuji derives fūdosei 風土性28 and fūdogaku 風土学29. The one that 
interest us the most here is the first one, which Berque translated as ‘me-
diance’. Being fūdosei the character of fūdo and fūdo a relation itself, as explai-
ned before, a word that could express the very character of that ongoing 
relation was required: mediance, then, is “the attributive character between 
the physical and the phenomenal, the natural and the cultural, the indivi-
dual and the collective”30. Is the instant, I would say, at the very middle of 
that relation (fūdo) where we find ourselves constantly; where both poles of 
each of the three dualisms meet. Or, as Watsuji defined it: “is the structural 
moment of human existence”31.
Now, why is fūdo an important notion for our reassessment of space? 
There are three main reasons. First, because Watsuji’s book is a reaction 
against Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time and its emphasis on time, to the 
detriment of space. We saw how the word ‘human being’ in Japanese (nin-
gen) has an implicit notion of space, or betweeness; it is expected, then, 
that Watsuji reacts against Heidegger’s lack of focus on space. For Watsuji, 
Heidegger’s account of being primarily based on time and the Dasein leads 
to an excessive focus on the individual, without considering the collecti-
ve and, therefore, spatiality32. Here, we can recover the above mentioned 
26.  Mochizuki 2006; Carter 2013
27.  Watsuji 1979, 3
28.  The –sei  性 suffix adds the idea of ‘character/function of’; so, from ‘climate’ (fūdo), the notion 
‘climaticity’ (fūdosei)  is sometimes used.
29.  The –gaku 学 suffix turns the word into a discipline, like construction (kenchiku 建築), archi-
tecture (kenchikugaku 建築学). In Bownas translation we find ‘the study of climate’. In Berque’s: 
‘mesology’.
30.  Berque 1997, 130
31.  Watsuji 1979, 3
32.  Watsuji 1979, 4
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fūdosei as the character that is neither individual nor collective because it is 
both at the same time. This means that, in Watsuji’s thought, each pole of 
the three dualisms referred to above cannot be treated on their own, in-
dependently: they are the very character (fūdosei) of our fūdo and the point 
from where we stand and deal with the world. Hence, Heidegger focus 
on individual leads Watsuji to approach the spatiality of human existence, 
which implies society as well as the surrounding environment, through the 
lens of the constant relation between nature and culture, subject and ob-
ject, individual and collective: the fūdo (milieu).
Second, because of the conclusion he draws from his ‘metaphor of 
the cold’. Although Watsuji reacts against the lack of spatiality in Heide-
gger, he is also strongly influenced by him when developing the argument 
that supports this metaphor. Very briefly, he tells us that it is impossible 
for us to know the existence of cold, as a transcendental phenomenon, 
before we feel cold ourselves33. The cold, as an objective, independent 
thing, forms itself for the first time when felt by the subject that acts in 
constant intentionality. At this process of intentionality – Heidegger’s sor-
ge (care) and Watsuji’s sotoni deru (stepping outside) – when the subject 
is feeling cold he is actually stepping outside into the cold. He concludes the 
metaphor by saying that it is at this very moment, when we step outside 
into the cold, that we “find ourselves”34. It is in this stepping outside that we, 
within an encounter with something that is not us (later we will find a cor-
relate of this in Nishida’s logic of basho), comprehend ourselves. In one of 
Watsuji’s examples: “[j]ust as we encounter our self happy or saddened in 
the wind that scatters the cherry blossoms, we comprehend our withering 
selves in times of drought when the sun scorches the trees”35. I believe this 
example is enough for a better understanding of fūdosei. Watsuji introduces 
other examples, based on construction materials and culinary, not as pro-
ducts of a geographical determinism, but as expressions of that “structural 
moment” when nature and culture find each other and, to some extent, 
influence each other – they are expressions of how human beings com-
prehend themselves in their fūdo (milieu)36.
The third reason is related to the absence of a definition or proble-
matic of space in Watsuji’s book. Indeed, while he points out the lack of 
spatiality in Heidegger as the primary reason for writing Fūdo, in the rest of 
the book he does not talk about space, but about distinctive types of clima-
te and their influence on human beings. First, we have to recall the word 
ningen 人間 and its implicit spatiality, meaning that we cannot separate 
33.  Watsuji 1979, 11
34.  Watsuji 1979, 13
35.  Watsuji 1979, 15
36.  Watsuji 1979, 17–19
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humans from space and produce an independent account on each one of 
them. If Watsuji prefers to work his theory from the notion of fūdo instead 
of nature to avoid objectification, it is only natural that he also does not 
develop a problematic of space. What he does, then, is to work out a des-
cription of the phenomena of the world itself and of fūdosei: that “structu-
ral moment” when culture meets nature. Berque37, recovering Nakamura 
Hajime’s ideas, links this to Japanese’s tendency of attaching themselves to 
“the sensible manifestations of nature, rather than referring them to some 
abstract principle”, illustrated by the proverb ‘Matsu no koto wa matsu ni 
narae’ (About pines, learn from the pines) – a tenet also present in Japane-
se aesthetics. We might consider, then, that Watsuji could not develop an 
abstract theory of space after having rejected the very notion of nature. Ins-
tead of developing a problematic of space (or even nature), he examined 
the relation between nature and culture in particular milieus.
Space as the basho of being
Nishida Kitarō’s main goal is to deconstruct the subject and object dualism. 
With the clear notion that a too brief account of his logic holds the risk of 
being overly simplistic, I will attempt to sum it up in a few sentences and 
then draw some hints from his discourse that are enough to grasp the logic 
behind Basho (Place).
Nishida’s logic, in my point of view, can be summarized in two key 
ideas: if (a) everything that exists, exists in something else38, then (b) whe-
never objects are to be related and form a single autonomous system, there 
must be something that sustains that system, somewhere where it takes 
place39 – this forms, what I will call, the ‘core logic’. Following this, Nishi-
da starts developing his logic of basho from what is central to the act of 
knowing: the consciousness. He writes that when we think of things there 
must be a basho that reflects them, which he calls “the field of conscious-
ness”. Thus, “[t]o be conscious of something is to reflect it in the field of 
consciousness”40. He then goes on arguing against the idea that the object 
stands on its own outside our consciousness. If this were the case, how can 
we, who are within our consciousness, conclude that the object exists and 
transcends our consciousness? His answer his quite straightforward and 
follows the core-logic: “For the consciousness and the object to be connec-
ted, there must be something that envelops both of them; there must be a 
37.  Berque 1998, 64
38.  An axiom stated for the first time by Archytas of Tarentum, which has repercussions in Plato 
and Aristotle’s accounts of place. 
39.  Nishida 1987, 67
40.  Nishida 1987, 69
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basho where their relation takes place”41. Nishida then starts to account for 
what this basho might be by pursuing a strong dialectical and metaphysical 
line of thought where he speaks about the “basho of true nothingness”, 
which I chose not to bring into this analysis.
My goal here is not to present a fully explained account of Basho, for it 
has been done before by some academics well versed in Japanese language 
and philosophy, but a much more elementary one: to take the core-logic 
of Basho, along with some hints developed by Nishida along his essay, and 
to interpret them as tools to help us think about space.
The main hints I will refer to are from his definition of ‘judgment’ 
and from his account of the relation between the particular and the uni-
versal, the subject and the predicate. For Nishida, “the act of knowing is an 
act of enveloping”42. And this ‘enveloping’ can be thought of as the main 
feature of a basho. On the other hand, ‘knowing’ is also formed by acts of 
judgment; and judgment is, in Nishida’s words, “the process of connecting 
the gap between the object of cognition and the place where it is reflected, 
its basho43. Nishida explains this argument using a grammatical example, 
which will lead us to the most meaningful hint for my analysis here. In the 
judgment ‘the rose is red’ the copula ‘is’ places the particular ‘rose’ inside 
the universal ‘red’ – ‘red’ becomes the basho of ‘rose’. Judgment, then, 
connects the gap between ‘rose’ and ‘red’, both of which do not hold any 
meaning if taken on their own. 
Until now there is nothing new, but the way Nishida characterizes the 
relation between the particular and the universal leads me to an interpre-
tation of the logic behind basho in spatial terms. According to Nishida, the 
copula ‘is’ forms the foundation of a judgment and expresses the relation 
between the universal and the particular. The judgment, then, becomes 
the process through which the universal particularizes and develops itself 
through specialization44. The way he defines this relation is central to my 
argument: 
the universal does not possess the particular, the particular is not the result 
of the universal, neither the relation between the two carries a meaning like 
‘space that contains objects’ or ‘objects that exist in space’ (…). “The par-
ticular is a part of the universal; it is his silhouette. (…) [T]hat which exists 
possesses partially (分有) the proprieties of the basho where it exists: things 
in space are spatial. 45
41.  Nishida 1987, 70
42.  Nishida 1987, 75
43.  Nishida 1987, 73
44. Nishida 1987, 89 The word Nishida uses is bunka-hatten 分化発展. Bunka 分化 means specializa-
tion; differentiation; the process of division with the goal of creating two or more different things. 
Hatten 発展 means both development, as in ‘argument development’ or growth, as in ‘city growth’.
45.  Nishida 1987, 86–87
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When trying to make sense of this logic and reinterpret it as a resour-
ce for the ‘being-space’ relationship, the connection between Nishida’s 
arguments and an ontological account of space can be smoothly accompli-
shed. For that, I will divide his discourse into two arguments: the dialectical 
and the grammatical argument. In the dialectical argument what is at stake 
is the idea that things exist in relation to one another, and something that 
is exists against what is not: we are humans only by opposition to what is 
not-human; or, I am myself only in opposition to others that are not myself. 
But, in Nishida’s core logic, there must be a basho where this opposition is 
reflected and that sets it up. So, I am human against what is not-human, 
and this relation is sustained and made possible through a basho that is spa-
ce: I can only be through the medium of space. Once again, the core-logic 
tells us that ‘everything that exists, exists in something else’: meaning that 
being that exists, exist in space. Here, we are already forming a judgment.
The grammatical argument draws from the definition of judgment 
explained before and completes this logic: forming a judgment is to pla-
ce a particular inside a universal, i.e. turning the universal into the basho 
of the particular; then, by logical inference, when examining the relation 
between being and its surroundings, space is the universal and being is the 
particular. We can now reinterpret Nishida’s account on the relation be-
tween the universal and the particular in order to elucidate us about the 
‘being-space’ relation: space does not possess being; being is not the result 
of space – which breaks away with a possible claim for geographical de-
terminism –, neither the relation between the two carries a meaning like 
‘objects that exist in space’ nor ‘space that contains objects’. Again, what 
exists, according to Nishida, possesses partially 分有 the properties of the 
basho where it exists: being possesses partially the proprieties of the space – 
basho – where it exists. 
Kopf  quotes Ueda Shizuteru’s concrete example concerning the ‘par-
ticular-universal’ relation and complements it:
There is no escaping the fact that England and I cannot be separated. En-
gland is the country in which I reside, and I reflect England by living there.” 
Consequently [Kopf adds], universals like the historical situation and the 
Zeitgeist are not transcendent or abstract but are concretely particularized in 
individual events. In this sense, there is no postmodernism without Jacques 
Derrida’s writings, no Nishida scholarship apart from particular essays on 
Nishida’s thought, no American lifestyle without individual Americans living 
their lives.46
46.  Kopf 2003, 32
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Concluding remarks
The look into Japanese aesthetics assumed the role of a brief introduction 
to some of the general characteristics of Japanese perception and laid the 
ground for a better understanding of the subsequent analysis. As we saw, 
the general tendency is to avoid descriptions and details. Whatever sensi-
ble phenomena exist in the world, their most fundamental truths can only 
be apprehended by our own taking-part of it.
This taking-part, on the other hand, is analogous to the idea of ‘care’ 
that Heidegger used to refer to a subject that is always towards something, 
i.e. that continuous intentionality that, constituting the most basic feature 
of being, casts the way we deal with the world experientially. Ex-sistere or 
sotoni deru, ‘stepping outside’ (as Watsuji called it), is our way of being: the 
process where we are constantly stepping outside into our surroundings 
and its constituents and where we first comprehend ourselves. When we 
assume that we cannot think of human beings separated from our own fūdo, 
to think of being as this constant process of self-understanding through the 
space we always already inhabit is to turn a supposedly abstract and measu-
rable notion of space into an indispensible part of being – or like the ma 間 
word: the very possibility of relation. 
With Nishida’s logic of basho we were able to turn space into the basho 
of being. Furthermore, examining his account of the ‘particular-universal’ 
relation we could see that while being is not possessed by space, neither 
determined by it, it possesses partially its properties. Here we are not sim-
ply claiming for, in Berque’s words, an “absolutization of the predicate”, 
but creating a relation between the universal (space) and the particular 
(being); between the subject and the predicate. If being possesses partially 
the properties of the space where it exists, then, space, while constituting 
a part of being, is being’s self-comprehension as well as an interpretation of 
that same being.
We can now return to Heidegger. Just like his idea of a praxis-orien-
ted space ontologically preceding and abstract and homogeneous space, I 
am also proposing a similar notion of space: a relational space that, being a 
constitutive and absolutely essential part of being, can only be fully grasped 
through being’s practical activities; in other words, through its ontological 
condition of being constantly towards something.
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Kitarō tetsugakuronshū-I] Ensaios Filosóficos de Nishida Kitarō I, 67–151. Tōkyō: Iwanami 
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